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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this action is vested in the Court of 
Appeals by virtue of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-2(a) (Supp. 1991). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This appeal presents one issue: Did the Board of 
Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah err by giving 
exclusive credit to Mr. Fullerton's inherently unbelievable 
testimony that he was not fired for Mjust cause" in light of 
the other evidence presented? The applicable standard of 
review is whether the agency's action is reasonable and 
rational. Bhatia v. Dept. of Employment Security, 834 P.2d 
574, (Utah App. 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutes and regulations are 
determinative of the issue presented for review: 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-5(b)(1)(Supp. 1991). 
An individual is ineligible for benefits or for 
purposes of establishing a waiting period: 
(b)(1) For the week in which the Claimant was 
discharged for just cause or for an act or omission in 
connection with employment, not constituting a crime, 
which is deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to 
the employer's rightful interest, if so found by the 
commission, and thereafter until the claimant has 
earned an amount equal to at least six times the 
Claimant's weekly benefit amount in bona fide covered 
employment. 
2. Rule 475-5b-102(l)(a) (b), and (c) of the Utah 
Administrative Code (1991). 
1. The basic factors which establish just cause, and 
are essential for a determination of 
ineligibility are: 
(a) Culpability. 
This is the seriousness of the conduct or 
the severity of the offense as it affects continuance 
of the employment relationship. The discharge must 
have been necessary to avoid actual or potential harm 
to the employer's rightful interests. A discharge 
would not be considered MnecessaryM if it is not 
consistent with reasonable employment practices. The 
wrongness of the conduct must be considered in the 
context of the particular employment and how it 
affects the employer's rights. If the conduct was an 
isolated incident of poor judgment and there is no 
expectation that the conduct will be continued or 
repeated, potential harm may not be shown and 
therefore it is not necessary to discharge the 
employee. 
(1) Longevity and prior work record are 
important in determining if the act or omission is an 
isolated incident or a good faith error in judgment. 
An employee who has historically complied with work 
rules does not demonstrate by a single violation, even 
though harmful, that such violations will be repeated 
and therefore require discharge to avoid future harm 
to the employer. . . . 
(b) Knowledge. 
The employee must have had knowledge of the 
conduct which the employer expected. It is not 
necessary that the claimant intended to cause harm to 
the employer, but he should reasonably have been able 
to anticipate the effect his conduct would have. 
Knowledge may not be established unless the employer 
gave a clear explanation of the expected behavior or 
had a pertinent written policy, except in the case of 
a flagrant violation of a universal standard of 
behavior. If the employer's expectations are unclear, 
ambiguous or inconsistent, the existence of knowledge 
is not shown. A specific warning is one way of 
showing that the employee had knowledge of the 
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expected conduct. After the employee is given a 
warning he should be given an opportunity to correct 
objectionable conduct. Additional violations 
occurring after the warning would be necessary to 
establish just cause for a discharge. . . . 
(c) Control 
The conduct must have been within the power and 
capacity of the Claimant to control or prevent. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This Writ of Review challenges the decision of the 
Board of Review of the Industrial Commission which confirmed a 
decision of the Administrative Law Judge that Albertsons lacked 
just cause within the meaning of the Utah Employment Security 
Act to discharge Mr. Fullerton. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Gayle M. Fullerton was employed by Albertsons, Inc. on 
April 5, 1981. Albertsons discharged him on April 3, 1992. 
R. 0001. Mr. Fullerton was a forklift operator on the day of 
his dismissal. Albertsons discharged Mr. Fullerton because he 
purposely damaged one of Albertsons' forklifts. R.0003. 
Mr. Fullerton claims that he did not purposely damage 
the forklift, but that he slipped, hitting the forklift as he 
fell. R.0012. 
Earl Ellis, a maintenance worker for Albertsons, 
witnessed the incident. He testified that Mr. Fullerton had 
trouble putting a retaining plate on the forklift and that he 
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"started beating on the machine." Mr. Ellis asked 
Mr. Fullerton to stop, but he would not. R.0032. 
Prior to setting forth the relevant facts which 
support the Appellant's position that the Board of Review erred 
by exclusively crediting Mr. Fullerton's testimony in light of 
the other evidence presented, the appellant shall hereby set 
forth, in its duty to marshall the evidence, facts which 
arguably support the Board's findings. 
In affirming the decision of the Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) in this matter, the Board of Review expressly 
adopted the Findings and Conclusions of the ALJ, R.0082, which 
specifically held that the claimant/appellee slipped and 
inadvertently broke the battery plate. R.0083. 
The ALJ relied upon the Claimant's own testimony that 
he slipped. The claimant stated: 
. . .When I stood up. . .1 was on the north 
side of the lift and Earl [Ellis] was on the 
south side. . .[H]e [Earl] couldn't see my 
feet. He was on the other side of the lift 
when I stood up. I slipped on the roller[s] 
[sic] that are somewhat oily anyway. And as 
I. . .grabbed for my balance. . .1 brought 
the plate down onto the lift. It chipped it 
a little bit and it, in no way 
broke. . .plastic. R.0041.l 
1/ In the Claimant's Statement of Job Discharge, Exhibit 8A 
attached to the transcript of the hearing before the ALJ, when 
asked "What could you have done to prevent the incident or 
situation which caused your discharge?" Fullerton wrote 
"Better control of self." R.0002. 
The Claimant states the plastic cover had already been 
broken. R.0041.2 
The Claimant stated that he was not banging on the 
equipment and that Ellis could not have seen whether he slipped 
because he could not have seen the Claimant's feet from where 
he was standing. R.0052. Furthermore, the Claimant in his 
Statement Regarding Claims for Benefits, Exhibit 9A, states: 
The battery was on rollers and I was 
standing on the rollers. I lost my balance 
and slipped while trying to regain my 
balance I hit the lift cover with the 
battery plate that was in my hand. I struck 
the lift twice before I regained my 
balance. R.0012-0013. 
In this Appeal, the Appellant relies upon the 
following additional relevant facts: 
On April 8, 1991, the Claimant signed a 
company policy sheet which set forth among 
other causes of dismissal the "[u]authorized 
possession of or damage to company funds, 
property or merchandise," and 
. . .the mishandling of company funds or 
property. Any employee willfully damaging 
company property. . .will be subject to 
immediate termination. Exhibit 4, R.0008. 
On April 2, 1992, Mr. Fullerton was seen "beating on" 
one of Albertson's fork lifts. Earl Ellis, maintenance worker, 
stated: 
2/ On page 2 of the Claimant's Statement of Job Discharge, 
Exhibit 8B, when asked "How did you violate [company] policy?", 
Fullerton wrote: "Damaged property". R.0003. 
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It was early morning, I was working 
graveyard shift at the time. He walked in 
to ask for a battery change, and I told him 
I'd be right there. I got up and wiped my 
hands to walk out, by that time he'd already 
pushed the other battery back in. He had 
trouble putting the retaining plate in and 
started beating on the machine. I asked him 
to stop; he wouldn't stop. I told him, I 
said, "You break that cover, I'm going to 
have to turn you in." His response was, "I 
don't give a shit, go ahead and turn me in. 
It'll be the last thing you ever do." 
R.0032. 
Ellis stated that after that conversation, Fullerton 
beat on the equipment a couple of more times and then left. 
R. 0032. Ellis stated that as he beat on the equipment it 
broke. R.0032. Ellis stated that he personally saw Fullerton 
physically bang on the battery cover several times. R.0034. 
Ellis testified that Fullerton appeared "extremely angry about 
something". R.0049. 
When asked if he could see where Fullerton was 
standing at the time he was banging on the equipment, Ellis 
stated that he was standing on the battery rack, which is a 
platform made of steel with rollers through the center of it. 
Ellis stated that Fullerton was standing on the platform next 
to the rollers. R.0032 and R.0033. Later, during the hearing, 
Ellis stated that he saw Fullerton striking the equipment while 
he was standing on the rail. R.0051. Ellis also testified 
that it is not normal procedure for someone to stand on the 
rollers to change the battery. R.0033. 
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Ellis testified at the time he asked Fullerton to stop 
hitting the equipment that the Claimant did not provide any 
excuse for what happened. R.0033. Ellis states that the cover 
was not broken prior to this time, that it was brand new. 
R.0035. 
Ellis testified that he and Fullerton had not had 
problems with each other in the past. R.0036. Fullerton also 
testified that the two had gotten along well previously. 
R.0041. 
Subsequent to the incident, Mr. Fullerton met with 
Scott Bradshaw, the Perishable Superintendent of Albertsons. 
Bradshaw states: 
I called him [Fullerton] in after Lavell 
James had approached me and told me what 
Earl had told him. That's when I called 
Mr. Fullerton in, and we talked about it; 
and it started out where he denied anything, 
as far as involvement with the battery, or 
the lid, or whatever. And we proceeded to 
tell him about what was said, and what we've 
heard, and what Earl and Lavell had told 
me. Later he said it was an accident, and 
that it was—had grease on it and it slipped 
out of his fingers . . . . R.0037 - 0038. 
On cross-examination, Bradshaw stated that during his 
interview with Mr. Fullerton, Mr. Fullerton did not state that 
the battery cover was already broken nor did he make the excuse 
that he was standing on the rollers and had slipped. R.0038. 
Darrell Kidd, Warehouse Operations Manager at the 
Albertsons distribution center in North Salt Lake, testified 
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that he made the decision to dismiss Mr. Fullerton. R.0025. 
The reason he gave for dismissal was the willful destruction of 
company property, which decision was based upon testimonies 
given to Mr. Kidd by Mr. Ellis, and based upon Mr. Fullerton's 
past record of similar incidents. R.0026. 
Mr. Kidd testified that Mr. Fullerton was suspended 
for willful destruction of company property on January 31, 
1990, when he kicked an office door and broke it. R.0026. 
See, also, Exhibit 6, R.0010.3 
Upon inquiry of this matter by the ALJ, Mr. Fullerton 
stated: 
I was goofing around. . . . I was just 
going through the motions of kicking the 
door, and I didn't kick it that hard. . . . 
In Mr. Fullerton's Statement Regarding Claims for 
Benefits, Exhibit 9A, Mr. Fullerton explained the January 31, 
1990, incident as follows: 
We were joking around. I pretended like I 
was going to kick the door, my foot slipped 
and I hit the door and cracked it at the 
hinges. I didn't mean to do it. . . . 
R.0012. 
The ALJ admitted the evidence of Fullerton's prior 
incident into the record but cautioned, "They will not be given 
very much weight". R.0044. 
3/ On cross-examination, Mr. Kidd testified that there is a 
Union Contract in effect between Albertsons and Teamsters 
(Footnote continued on next page) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The only reasonable conclusion after reviewing all the 
facts in evidence is that Mr. Fullerton wantonly and willfully 
destroyed or attempted to destroy company property. Such 
conduct constituted grounds for immediate termination. 
Mr. Fullerton knew, or should have known, that his actions of 
striking company equipment would, or could, result in his 
termination. It was within Mr. Fullerton's control to stop 
striking the equipment after being told by maintenance 
personnel to do so. The employer suffered loss as result of 
Mr. Fullerton's actions. The board of review and the ALJ acted 
unreasonably and irrationally by unduly crediting 
Mr. Fullerton's inconsistent and incredible testimony regarding 
the incident in light of the overwhelming evidence presented to 
the contrary. 
ARGUMENT 
THE CONDUCT OF MR. FULLERTON ESTABLISHED JUST 
CAUSE FOR HIS TERMINATION 
Under Utah law, if an employee is terminated for "just 
cause" he is ineligible for unemployment benefits. See, 
Stegen v. Department of Employment Sec, 751 P.2d 1160 (Utah 
(Footnote continued from previous page) 
Local 222 that covers the warehouse employees. R.0028. 
Mr. Kidd testified that the discharge language in the Contract 
states that warnings shall not remain in effect for a period of 
more than one year. 
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App. 1988). The employer must establish that the employee's 
conduct warranting dismissal involved three factors: 
1. Culpability; 
2. Knowledge of expected conduct; and 
3. The offending conduct was within the employee's 
control. 
Pro Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439, 442 
(Utah App. 1989). 
Employee "culpability" is the first factor in the test 
for just cause. Board Regulations define culpability as "the 
seriousness of the conduct or the severity of the offense as it 
affects continuance of the employment relationship." Bhatia v. 
Department of Employment Security, 834 P.2d 574, (Utah App. 
1992), quoting Utah Code Admin. P. R.475-5b-102(1)(a). 
Board regulations further state that employers have a 
"right to expect employees to refrain from acts which are 
detrimental to the business" or which affect the good will of 
customers, business, efficiency or discipline. Utah Code 
Admin. P. R.475-5b-107 (1991). See, also, Utah Code Admin. P. 
R.475-5b-108(l)(d) (1991). ("Culpability is established if 
termination of the employee was required to maintain necessary 
discipline in the company"). Mr. Ellis testified that 
Mr. Fullerton intentionally "beat on" the employer's 
equipment. He testified that Mr. Fullerton appeared "extremely 
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angry.M Mr. Ellis stated that when he demanded that 
Mr. Fullerton stop beating on the equipment, and threatened to 
turn him in, Mr. Fullerton stated MI don't give a shit, go 
ahead and turn me in. It will be the last thing you ever do." 
Mr. Fullerton denies using vulgarity and states that he made 
the statement jokingly. 
After this "conversation", Fullerton beat on the 
equipment a couple of more times and then left. The board 
regulations recognize that: 
"[a]uthority is required in the work 
place to maintain order and efficiency. 
An employer has the right to expect lines 
of authority will be maintained; that 
reasonable orders given in a civil 
manner, will be obeyed; that supervisors 
will be respected and that their 
authority will not be undermined." Utah 
Code Admin. P. R.475-5b-108(4) (1991). 
Admittedly, Mr. Ellis was not Mr. Fullerton's direct 
supervisor. However, Mr. Ellis was responsible to maintain the 
equipment and Mr. Fullerton was aware of this fact. In 
determining "when insubordination (resistance to authority) 
becomes disqualifying conduct, the fact that there was a 
disregard of the employer's interest is of major importance . . 
[P]rovocative remarks to a superior, or vulgar or profane 
language in response to a civil request may be insubordination 
if it is conducive to disruption of routine, negation of 
authority and impairment of efficiency." Utah Code Admin. P. 
R.475-5b-108(4) (1991); see, also, Hohmann v. Department of 
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Employment Sec., 688 P.2d 465, 465-66 (Utah 1984) (per curiam) 
(Employee who "became angry, vulgar and profane" in presence of 
supervisor and others was properly denied unemployment benefits 
for insubordination). 
Fullerton's action was not a single isolated incident 
of poor judgment. He had been reprimanded and punished for 
similar abusive misconduct in the past, when he kicked an 
office door and broke it. In any event, a single violation is 
sufficient to demonstrate employment culpability. In Kehl v. 
Board of Review, 700 P.2d 1129 (Utah 1985), a fork lift 
operator, terminated for violating a company safety rule, 
appealed the Board's denial of employment benefits. The Court 
affirmed stating: 
"[T]he proper emphasis under the 
culpability requirement should not be 
upon the number of violations; rather, 
it should address the problem of 
whether the discharge was 'necessary to 
avoid actual or potential harm to the 
employer's rightful interest.fM IcL at 
1134 quoting Utah Code Admin. P. 
R.475-5b-102(l)(a). 
Albertsons admits that it carries a heavy burden in 
seeking to overturn the Board's factual findings. It must 
demonstrate that the findings are not "supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the 
Court." Department of Air Force v. Swider, 824 P.2d 448, 451 
(Utah App. 1991), quoting Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) 
(1989). In this case, however, Mr. Fullerton's explanations 
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simply do not constitute substantial evidence in light of the 
whole record. ''Substantial evidence" is such relevant evidence 
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion." Grace Drilling Company v. Board of Review, 776 
P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989). 
In the instant case, the record is replete with 
evidence of disinterested eyewitnesses so as to make it 
unreasonable for the Board to rely upon the uncorroborated and 
self-contradicting testimony of Mr. Fullerton. As Commissioner 
Disera ably stated in his dissent to the Board of Review's 
findings, the record is persuasive that "Mr. Ellis' version of 
the incident leading to the Claimant's discharge is more 
trustworthy than the Claimant's version." The Commissioner 
noted: 
"Mr. Ellis had no apparent advantage to 
be gained by saying the Claimant 
repeatedly and willfully beat on the 
battery plate. The Claimant, in fact, 
testified that he and Mr. Ellis got 
along well and no motive is suggested 
in the record why Mr. Ellis would lie. 
When asked if he could have been 
mistaken about what he saw, Mr. Ellis 
was steadfast in repeating that the 
Claimant was beating on the plate in 
frustration, not just trying to regain 
his balance after a fall. The 
Claimant, on the other hand, when 
accused of beating on the employer's 
property, had everything to gain by 
claiming he slipped and accidentally 
damaged the battery plate. The 
Claimant's account is further thrown 
into question because of his claim two 
years earlier that he accidentally 
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slipped and broke a door jam when was 
kicking at a door while horsing 
around. I find the Claimant's repeated 
excuse of "slipping" when others 
reported more willful behavior to be 
suspicious." The Board of Review 
decision, Disera dissent R.0083. 
The dissent also recognizes that Mr. Ellis1 version of 
the incident has not varied from the time he first reported 
it. Mr. Fullerton1s account of the incident, on the other 
hand, has varied and evolved over time. As Mr. Fullerton1s 
supervisor, Scott Bradshaw, testified when the Claimant was 
first told of the charges "he denied anything, as far as 
involvement with the battery, or the lid". After Mr. Bradshaw 
informed Mr. Fullerton of the statements of Earl Ellis, he 
admitted involvement and stated "it was an accident." 
Mr. Fullerton then subsequently told Mr. Bradshaw that the 
battery cover "had grease on it" and it "slipped out of his 
fingers..." During his interview with Mr. Bradshaw, 
Mr. Fullerton did not state that the battery cover was already 
broken, nor did he make the excuse that he was standing on the 
rollers and that his feet had slipped and that he had lost his 
balance. Self contradictory testimony is inherently 
incredible. The ALJ and Board of Review erred by unreasonably 
crediting such testimony in light of the other evidence. If a 
"witness testifies falsely as to any material part of his 
testimony, his testimony may be disregarded as a whole." 
Montez v. State, 527 P.2d 1330 (Wyo. 1974). 
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In contrast, Mr. Ellis testified from the beginning 
that he saw Mr. Fullerton beat numerous times on the equipment 
in anger and frustration. The ALJ "minimized" Mr. Ellis' 
unequivocal testimony by finding that Mr. Ellis temporarily did 
not see Mr. Fullerton1s feet, and thus, could not say whether 
he was falling. Mr. Ellis testified that he could not see 
Mr. Fullerton's feet only momentarily, and testified that he 
could still see that the Claimant was not falling. He 
testified that Mr. Fullerton was beating on the plate in anger, 
which allegation is supported by the fact that Mr. Fullerton 
struck the equipment again after Mr. Ellis told him to stop and 
then threatened Mr. Ellis. 
Mr. Fullerton claims to have accidentally hit the 
battery plate twice. In light of the other evidence, as 
Commissioner Disera states, this explanation "does not ring 
true." To have accidentally hit the plate twice would mean 
that Mr. Fullerton slipped and fell twice. Even the Claimant 
has not testified that this was the case. To accept this 
theory, the ALJ and the Board of Review had to completely 
disregard and ignore the disinterested testimony of Mr. Ellis. 
The ALJ and the Board of Review erred by either 
ignoring or giving little weight to additional evidence 
presented by the Appellant that Mr. Fullerton had intentionally 
damaged company property in the past. Mr. Kidd testified that 
Mr. Fullerton was suspended for willful destruction of company 
-1 q_ 
property on January 31, 1990 when he kicked an office door and 
broke it. In Mr. Fullerton's Statement Regarding Claims for 
Benefit he explained the door-kicking incident occurred when he 
was joking around and his "foot slipped" and he hit the door 
and cracked it. 
It is true that the union contract between Albertsons 
and Teamsters Local 222 provides that employee warning notices 
will not remain in effect for more than one year. However, the 
infraction for which Mr. Fullerton was discharged, willful 
destruction of company property, was grounds for immediate 
dismissal under the employer rules. As Commissioner Disera 
stated in his dissent: 
"There was no need on the part of the 
employer to go through any step-by-step 
disciplinary procedure in the face of 
the Claimant's action and they did not 
do so. Referencing his past behavior 
of kicking in a door was not necessary 
to sustain a discharge, but only adds 
strength to the employer's argument 
that this was an employee who exercised 
marginal control over his temper and 
who the employer might reasonably 
expect to see repeat destructive 
behavior." Board of Review Decision, 
Disera Dissent R.0084. 
Indeed, evidence of Mr. Fullerton's prior willful 
misconduct is consistent with Mr. Fullerton's own statement in 
the Claimant's Statement of Job Discharge, Exhibit 8A where 
Mr. Fullerton responds to the inquiry "what could you have done 
to prevent the incident or situation which caused your 
discharge?" by stating: "Better control of self". 
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The employer established from the testimony of 
Mr. Ellis and through the evidence of the prior incident as 
well, that Mr. Fullerton had full knowledge of his expected 
conduct. Board Regulations "specify the employee need not have 
intended to harm the employer but 'should reasonably have been 
able to anticipate the effect his conduct would have'". 
Bhatia v. Department of Employment Security, 834 P.2d at 580, 
quoting Utah Code Admin. P. R.475-5b-102(l)(b). An employer 
may demonstrate an employee's knowledge through "a specific 
warning" which warning is evidenced by the January 31, 1990 
incident wherein the Claimant was suspended for his behavior of 
kicking the door. Such knowledge may also be demonstrated by 
establishing the violation as one of a "universal standard of 
behavior the employee is presumed to know". Bhatia, 834 P.2d 
at 580 citing Utah Code Admin. P. R.475-5b-102(1)(c). 
Lastly, the employer needs to establish that the 
conduct was within the power and capacity of Mr. Fullerton to 
control or prevent. If this court accepts the disinterested 
testimony of Mr. Ellis that Mr. Fullerton was intentionally 
beating on the equipment, it is self evident that the 
Claimant's conduct was within Mr. Fullerton1s power to 
control. Even if Mr. Fullerton did not believe he was damaging 
the property, when he was told to stop beating on the equipment 
by the person responsible for maintaining the equipment he 
could clearly have stopped at that point. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Board of Review's findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the Court. To affirm the ALJ's findings, the Board of 
Review unreasonably credited Mr. Fullerton's testimony and 
disregarded all of the contrary evidence on the record. Such 
evidence includes the disinterested testimonies of Mr. Ellis, 
Mr. Bradshaw and Mr. Kidd, the prior incident involving the 
claimant, and the Claimant's own contradictory statements. The 
Appellant's evidence on the record clearly establishes the 
employee's culpability, knowledge and control. For these 
reasons, the Court should reverse the unreasonable findings of 
the Board of Review and deny the benefits sought by the 
Claimant. 
DATED this day of November, 1992. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
By. *—^—w+~^2^ 
Robert G. Wing 
Roger J. McConkie 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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